3 May 1961

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CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN



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
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East Germany Completes Most of Steps to Facilitate Interzonal Trade

On 24 April 1958 the East Germans imposed an additional tax of about 70 cents a ton, based on carrying capacity, on West German and West Berlin barges using East German waterways. They explained that West Germany's construction of a dam on the Elbe River near Hamburg would necessitate extensive work on adjacent East German waterways to regulate the water level. The East German decision to abolish these additional tolls on 1 May was announced on 20 April, thus, in effect, meeting a West German deadline; Bonn had threatened to take retaliatory measures unless East Germany moved to reduce the tolls by 21 April. The smaller original tax for barges using East German rivers and canals and locks on these waterways will be continued.

In announcing the abolition of this tax, Neues Deutschland alleged on 21 April that the West German Government had pledged that further work on the Elbe River dam would not result in changes in East German waterways. The West Berlin press notes, however, that revenue from the increased barge tolls has amounted to approximately \$17,500,000—considerably in excess of the \$12,500,000 originally asked by the East Germans in 1958 as damages and costs to offset the rise in the Elbe water level after construction of the dam.

One other technical concession remains to be negotiated: that is to determine how much Bonn must pay for badly needed repair work on a bridge on the southern Autobahn near Hof. So far, East Germany's compliance with the terms of its December commitments has been secured only by Bonn's delay in delivering certain products badly needed by the East Germans.

Meanwhile, Neues Deutschland on 24 April attacked West Germany for interfering with interzonal trade, notably because it has issued revocable licenses for certain products exchanged under the trade pact. Such licenses, it alleged, cause "unbearable insecurity" in the execution of East German commercial contracts with West German firms. The editorial also declared

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that West Germany was delaying the implementation of import agreements made when the pact was renewed.

The Neues Deutschland editorial may be an attempt to camouflage East Germany's current difficulties in securing West German goods without paying hard currency. Kurt Leopold, the West German interzonal trade negotiator, noted that East Germany could not export enough products to pay for West German goods purchased under the trade pact, had practically exhausted available "swing" credits, had canceled some contracts, and was importing only priority goods from West Germany.

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The long-awaited reshuffle of the King's cabinet, apparently would introduce no new personalities to the Moroccan scene, but would continue Hassan's technique of relying heavily on the prestige of his father. Istiqlal would gain primarily by
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the promotion to deputy premier of Minister of Justice
Abdelkhalek Torres, a particularly able member of its ex-
ecutive committee and former ambassador to Cairo. More-
over, the projected nomination of Mohamed Boucetta, also a
member of Istiqlal's executive committee, as minister of for-
eign affairs should consolidate the party's hold over that min-
istry. Boucetta has been Morocco's senior representative in
the Congo and has been influential in developing Morocco's
policy supporting the Stanleyville regime. He is reported to
have become the most anti-American member of the Moroccan
Government. Both Torres and Boucetta were close to Mohamed V.
The proposed cabinet reorganization might alleviate the
present stalemate in government operations caused in part by
a concentration of such diverse functions as agriculture and in-
terior under the prime ministry. It would not, however, ap-
pease widespread discontent caused by the lack of dynamism
which has characterized Moroccan governmental operations
since independence. Unless the King delegates responsibility,
this reorganization would not long satisfy the Istiqlal party,
whose national council on 23 April demanded both the forma-
tion of a modern responsible government with well-defined
powers and the drawing up of a constitution. 25X1
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Dominican Dissidents Plot to Overthrow Trujillo Regime

The dissidents, should they succeed in overthrowing Trujillo, plan to approach President Joaquin Balaguer and demand that he sign a proclamation turning the government over to the junta. If Balaguer refuses, they intend to depose him and to install the junta!

One dissident army general believes he has the loyalty of 35 percent of the armed forces, while two other generals expect to sway more than half of the army in the important north-central part of the country. The revolutionaries also hope for support in the same region from peasants who recently have been demonstrating their loyalty to the local bishop in the face of great intimidation by the secret police. The dissidents, however, are not known to have any collaborators in the air force, but they believe at least half of the 80 pilots are anti-Trujillo. The loyalty of the air force's mobile ground division—a force roughly comparable in size and firepower to a US World War II regimental combat team—is unknown. This force and two army brigades commanded by members of Trujillo's family are stationed at Ciudad Trujillo

Should the initial attempt to seize or kill Trujillo fail, these units probably would remain loyal to him, while officers deeply implicated in the plot and who are in control of units in outlying towns might decide to risk civil war rather than to face prospects of torture and execution following their arrest. If the dissidents are able to neutralize Trujillo, almost all Dominicans, except for those military men and members of the secret police probably would offer no significant resistance to the revolutionaries. The dictator's sons and several other close relatives are reported abroad or planning to leave the country soon.

The group which is to capture or kill Trujillo may not have enough arms to ensure success. It believes quick action is necessary before Trujillo learns of their plot—if in fact he has not already done so.

Meanwhile, Trujillo is reported to believe that exiles in Venezuela are about to invade the Dominican Republic. On 27/

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April he reportedly ordered four of his generals to tighten security and assigned Felix Bernardino, head of a paramilitary peasant force in the eastern part of the country, to be vigilant along the coasts. Artillery and tanks are said to have been sent to strategic places and aircraft to have been dispersed. A member of the opposition told the US Consulate at Ciudad Trujillo that he had heard the invasion is being postponed until Trujillo relaxes these security measures. However, there is no information tending to confirm that an exile force of any size is preparing to invade the Dominican Republic.

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